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THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE
ACT: DOES IT MAKE UNREASONABLE
DEMANDS ON EMPLOYERS?
ROBERT J. AALBERTS* AND LORNE H. SEIDMAN**
I. INTRODUCTION
The pressing needs of a spiraling number of working women with
preschool and school-age children,' combined with the needs of an
increasing number of single-parent households2 and elderly Americans3
merged to shape the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") of
1993.' Congress passed the FMLA on February 3, 1993, ' and President
* Ernst Leid Professor of Legal Studies at' the College of Business at the University of
Nevada, Las Vegas. Professor Aalberts earned his Juris Doctor at Loyola University and an
M.A. from the University of Missouri-Columbia.
** Professor of Legal Studies in the College of Business at the University of Nevada, Las
Vegas. Professor Seidman received his Juris Doctor from Case Western Reserve University.
1. S. REP. No. 103-3, at 5-6 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 8 (stating that "[iun
its Corporate Reference Guide to Work-Family Programs, the Families and Work Institute
predicts that by 1995, two-thirds of women with pre-school children and three-quarters of the
women with school-age children will be in the labor force.").
2. Id. at 6. The report states in pertinent part:
The Census Bureau reports that single parents accounted for 27 percent of all family
groups with children under 18 years old in 1988, more than twice the 1970
proportion. Divorce, separation, and out-of-wedlock births have left millions of
women to struggle as single heads of households to support themselves and their
children.
Id.
3. Id. The report states in pertinent part:
Due to advances in medical technology and health care, Americans are living longer
than ever before. The fastest growing segment of the American population is the
elderly. Currently 32 million Americans are aged 65 and over, comprising 12 percent
of the populations. Between 1980 and 1990, the number of people aged 75 or older
grew by nearly one third.
Id.
4. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1988 & Supp. V
1993)).
5. Lawrence B. Fine, et. al., Family, Medical Leave Legislation: Ensuring Corporate
Compliance, NAT'L L.J., March 8, 1993, at S7. Prior to the FMLA's passage, at least 35 states
possessed unpaid work leave laws in various forms, but generally only applying to the public
sector. See Tim Barnett et. al., An Overview of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,44
LAB. L.J. 429, 432 (1993). The United States and South Africa were, until the FMLA was
passed, the only industrialized nations which had no federal maternity or parental leave policy.
See James A. Burstein & Jeri A Lindahl, Parental-Medical Leave: A New Trend in Labor
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Clinton promptly signed it two days later. It went into effect for most
covered workers on August 5th of that year.6 The President, who
enthusiastically supported the FMLA,7 explained that the Act:
mandates that public and private employers with at least fifty
workers provide their employees with family and medical leave.
At its core is the provision for employees to take up to 12 weeks
of unpaid leave for the care of a newborn or newly adopted child,
for the care of a family member with a serious medical condition,
or for their own illness.'
"American workers," the President concluded, "will no longer have to
choose between the job they need and the family they love."9
More specifically, the FMLA governs all employers engaged in
interstate commerce ° with fifty or more workers employed daily for at
least twenty weeks in a calendar year" that work within seventy-five
miles of the worksite." Eligible employees must have been employed
for a minimum of twelve months and have worked a minimum of 1250
hours during that twelve month period.'3  An employee 14 who is
qualified is entitled to up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave per year 15 for
the following reasons: (1) the birth or care of a newborn; 6 (2) the care
Legislation, 14 EMPLOY. REL. L.J. 299, 301 (1988).
6. For workers with a collective bargaining agreement in effect with management, the
FMLA became effective on the expiration of the contract or Feb. 5, 1994, whichever came
first. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.102(a) (1995) (discussing the effective date of the FMLA); see also
id. at § 825.700(c)(1) (discussing effective date of FMLA when a collective bargaining
agreement exists).
7. Hilary Stout, Clinton to Seek Wider Family-Leave Law, WALL ST. J., June 25, 1996,
at A2 ("[T]he Family and Medical Leave Act [is] frequently cited by Mr. Clinton as a
hallmark of his administration.").
8. Statement on Signing the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 144-45 (Feb. 8, 1993).
9. Id. at 144.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A) (1994). The term "employer" also includes any "public
agency" as it is defined under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. See id. § 203(x). The
U.S. government, its agencies, states, and their political subdivisions, the District of Columbia
and any Territory or possession of the United States, would be included in this definition. Id.
11. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(B); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.111(a) (discussing what constitutes
a "worksite").
13. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A); see also id. § 2611(2)(B) (discussing excluded workers).
14. Qualification for leave under the FMLA applies equally to males and females. See
29 C.F.R. § 825.112(b).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1).
16. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(A). See generally 29 C.F.R. § 825.112(c) (allowing leave to start
before the birth of the child for such activities as prenatal care or for women unable to work
because of the pregnancy).
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of a child newly placed in the employee's home via foster placement or
adoption; 7 (3) the care of a seriously ill spouse, son, daughter, or
parent;" and (4) a serious health condition which renders the employee
incapable of meeting the requirements of the job.'9 At the end of the
qualified leave period, an employee is entitled to the reinstatement of
full employment rights and benefits.2 An employee wrongly denied
FMLA leave is entitled to compensatory damages equal to wages, salary,
benefits, and other compensation lost due to the violation plus interest.
Moreover, unless a court determines the employer acted in good faith,
the employee is entitled to liquidated damages equal to the amount of
compensatory damages and interest.2' If appropriate, equitable relief,
including reinstatement, is available. 2
The FMLA is thus a federally mandated exception to the common
law concept of employment at will.' Congress's intent, expressed by
the FMLA, is "to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs
of families, to promote the stability and economic security of families,
17. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(B). Leave granted for the adoption of a child can be for
purposes of attending counseling sessions, appearing in court, and consulting with an attorney.
29 C.F.R. § 825.112(d).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). For coverage under the FMLA, a "spouse" is a husband
or wife under state law including common law if applicable. 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(a). "Parent"
includes biological parents as well as anyone who stood "in loco parentis" for the employee
when that employee was a child. Id. § 825.113(b). A "son" or "daughter" is a biological,
adopted, foster or stepchild, legal ward or child of a person "in loco parentis" and can be over
eighteen if the child cannot care for himself or herself or has a disability as defined under the
Americans with Disabilities Act. Id. § 825.113(c).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(1-2) (discussing what
constitutes a "serious medical condition" under the FMLA).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.214(a) (entitling an employee to the
same position that the employee held before the leave or an equivalent position with
equivalent pay, benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A).
22. Ld. § 2617(a)(1)(B).
23. Id. § 2615(a)(2) ("[l]t shall be unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other
manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by this
subchapter."). Employment at will, developed in 1877 by Horace Gay Wood and sometimes
called "Wood's Rule" states "that a general or indefinite hiring is 'prima facie' a hiring at will,
and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it
by proof ...." Robert J. Aalberts and Lorne Seidman, The Employment at Will Doctrine:
Nevada's Struggle Demonstrates the Need for Reform, 43 LAB. L.J. 651 (1992) (quoting
BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES § 134 (1877)). Although employment at will is still the
presumptive rule of law governing employer-employee relationships, "trends on the national
level, confirm the decline of employment at will as inflexible doctrine." Id. at 651-52. See also
Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
118 (1976); Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment-at-Will Rule, Revisited, 23
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 733 (1990).
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and to promote national interests in preserving family integrity."' 4
The purpose of this Article, however, is not to dissect and analyze
every provision of this undeniably complex statute. This has already been
done in meticulous fashion. 5 Rather, the purpose is to demonstrate that
despite the FMLA's complexity, employers may take an alleged violation
to trial without suffering the retention of unproductive employees if they
understand what constitutes a "serious medical condition '2 6 and the
provisions of the FMLA's employees' notice requirements.2 7  This
analysis will be accomplished primarily by examining the use of summary
judgments in recent federal FMLA cases.' This article will also discuss
how some employers have successfully terminated apparently unproduc-
tive employees claiming shelter under the Act.29
Some commentators perceive the FMLA as placing employers at the
mercy of unmotivated employees. One commentator suggests that the
FMLA is deceptively simple in its purpose, but "anything but simple in
its execution. '30  One attorney who practices employment law is far
more severe. The FMLA, he asserts, "is feel-good family legislation,"
but "it's probably the most employer-hostile piece of legislation there is
24. Seidle v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 871 F. Supp. 238, 241 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
25. See Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 TEx. L. REV. 1047 (1994)
(discussing the need to accommodate the workplace for men, including an examination of the
FMLA as a tool for doing so); Carol Daugherty Rasnic, The United States' 1993 Family and
Medical Leave Act: How Does It Compare with Work Leave Laws in European Countries? 10
CONN. J. INT'L L. 105 (1994) (comparing the FMLA and the various leave acts of European
countries). See generally Alice E. Conway A Guide to Practical Knowledge of the FMLA and
Its Complex New Final Regulations, 1995 LAB. L.J. 515 (1995) (addressing important aspects
of the FMLA in question and answer format); Jane Rigler, Analysis and Understanding of the
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 457 (1995) (discussing the
inconsistencies and shortcomings of the FMLA and its accompanying interim final regulations);
Nancy R. Daspit, Comment, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: A Great Idea But A
'Rube Goldberg' Solution? 43 EMORY L.J. 1351 (1994) (discussing the issues related to Titles
I and IV of the FMLA to demonstrate the complexity of the Act, which is deceptively simple
in its purpose); Barnett, supra note 5; Gerald L. Mattman, Jr. & Andrew J. Boling, What You
Should Know About the Family and Medical Leave Act, 39 PRAC. LAW. 21 (1993) (discussing
the major provisions of the FMLA and how they will apply to the workplace).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 73-125.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 153-226.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 44-72. See also infra text accompanying notes 98-
105 (discussing Seidle case); text accompaning notes 106-112 (discussing Bauer case); text
accompanying notes 113-117 (discussing Gaudenkauf case); text accompanying notes 126-135
(discussing McCown case); text accompanying notes 137-144 (discussing Niemiec case); and
text accompanying notes 145-150 (discussing Sakallarion case).
29. See infra notes 126-151 and accompanying text.
30. Daspit, supra note 25, at 1352.
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[and it] provides for all kinds of mischief."' Another critic describes the
FMLA as "a nightmare" for employers as they attempt to comply with
its requirements.32 In short, scholarly commentators and practitioners
have voiced opinions that the FMLA is extremely complex and "exactly
the kind of thing Newt Gingrich has been criticizing as government
nitpicking."33
Problems with the FMLA cannot be dismissed merely because the
Secretary of Labor has concluded it "is a pretty easy Act to comply
with."34 This is even more evident when one considers current esti-
mates of workplace absenteeism. The Commission on Family and
Medical Leave, reporting to Congress on the effect of the FMLA,
predicts that forty-percent of all covered workers will take an average
FMLA leave of ten days over the next five years.3 In addition,
unscheduled workplace absenteeism is increasing. The average
employee's unscheduled absences went from six in 1992 to seven in 1995,
constituting an increase of more than sixteen-percent.36 Many of these
absences are abuses of company policy and the FMLA. Only forty-five-
percent of sick days are used for personal illness and twenty-seven-
percent for "family issues."37 The others are taken for stress or simply
because the employee feels entitled" to the days off.38
Even assuming these numbers are imprecise, they indicate that a
substantial number, one-quarter to one-third, of unscheduled absences
are unrelated to any reasonable interpretation of the FMLA. Employers
cannot afford to accept the FMLA as a shield to protect those employees
who demonstrate a lack of commitment.
Employers are well aware that an indolent employee sets a bad
example for co-workers and also wastes valuable resources.39 Especially
31. Thorn Weidlich, Leave Law Still Draw Ire Despite Employer Wins, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
9, 1995, at B1 (quoting Houston employment lawyer Lawrence H. Clore).
32. James L. Dam, New 'Family Leave' Regs Make Employers Scramble, LAW. WKLY.
U.S.A., Jan. 30, 1995, at 12.
33. Id. (quoting Chicago employment lawyer Gerald Koning).
34. Susan A. Bocamazo, 'Absent' Workers Are Now Suing Under Federal Law, LAW.
WKLY. U.S.A., May 6,1996, at 16.
35. Corey E. Fleming, 'Family Leave Act' Is Unlikely to Be Changed Despite Complaints,
LAW. WKLY. U.S.A., May 20, 1996, at 22.
36. Rochelle Sharp, Workplace Epidemic: Absenteesism Rises for Third Year in a Row,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1996, at Al.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See generally Clayton P. Alderfer, An Empirical Test of a New Theory of Human
Needs, 4 ORG. BEHAV. HUM. PERF. 142 (1969).
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in recent years, faced with a problematic economy and increasing
competition (a result of the controversial NAFTA, for example),
employers have sought to adopt more stringent absence-control
policies.' A common example is a policy providing for progressive
discipline and eventual termination of employees absent for any reason
after more than a stated number of days within a stated period of
time.4' Other policies establish a formula relating days on the job to
days absent.4" These simplistic mechanical approaches are no longer
effective if an employee is protected by the FMLA.43
The growing aggregation of federal cases interpreting the FMLA
provides employers with a strategy for avoiding the risk and cost of trial
through the use of summary judgment. For an employer, this is a critical
stage in litigating any wrongful termination charge.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT: AN EFFECTIVE TOOL FOR DISMISSING
FMLA CASES?
The concept of summary judgment dates back to 1855.44 In that
year the English Parliament passed Keating's Act, more formally titled
"The Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act."45 Keating's Act
was originally designed to permit courts, before trial, to identify debtors
who sought to delay proceedings against them by asserting a "spurious
defense. '46  This basic concept is now well incorporated in civil
procedure47 and is codified in federal practice as Rule 56(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.48
Because complaints omitting necessary allegations may survive a
motion to dismiss under the Federal Rules, the motion for summary
judgment becomes "the first real opportunity" to dispose of deficient
40. Paul E. Starkman, 'Absence-Control Plans' Can Unleash Litigation, NAT'L L.J., May
10, 1993, at 26.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Brannon v. OshKosh B'Gosh, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 1028, 1030 (M.D. Tenn.
1995) ("[A]ny absence [under the company's policy] that qualifies under FMLA should not
be counted against the employee."). See also infra text accompanying notes 81-95 (discussing
OshKosh's absence-control policy).
44. Martin B. Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE
L.J. 745 (1974).
45. Id. at 745 n.1.
46. Id. at 745.
47. Id.
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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complaints.49 Courts have interpreted Rule 56(c) to "[mandate] the entry
of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery... against a
party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of
an element essential to that party's case."50
The "nonmoving party," typically the employee in FMLA litigation,
must introduce evidence beyond mere pleadings to demonstrate an issue
of material fact on an element essential to their case." But the
nonmoving party need only show there is some issue of material fact,
and in employment litigation this standard is "applied with 'added
rigor. 52
Thus, a motion for summary judgment is granted if a review of the
"pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file,
together with any affidavits show there is no issue of any material
fact."'5 In assessing the available evidence, the court will view "all
factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion."54 Again, this would commonly, but not always,
be the employee.5 Moreover, the party opposing summary judgment
"need not respond to it with affidavits or other evidence unless and until
the movant has properly supported the motion with sufficient evi-
dence. , 56
A nonmoving employee "must do more than simply show that there
is some 'metaphysical doubt' as to the material facts."57 The employee
must come forward with some specific facts indicating a genuine issue for
trial. 8 "The burden on the nonmoving employee in employment
litigation, however, is not heavy."59
49. Louis, supra note 44, at 746.
50. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
51. Id.
52. Hendry v. GTE North, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 816,822 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted) (discussing the application of a motion for summary judgment in an FMLA
case).
53. Brown v. J.C. Penny Corp., 924 F. Supp. 1158, 1160 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (discussing the
application of motion for summary judgment in an FMLA case).
54. Id.
55. Id. (citations omitted).
56. Id.
57. It.
58. Hendry, 896 F. Supp. at 822 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indust. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)).
59. Id. "In ruling on a summary judgment motion the court accepts as true the non-
moving party's evidence, draws all legitimate inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and
does not weigh the evidence of credibility of witnesses." Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)).
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As the preceding discussion indicates and a review of current case
law will soon demonstrate, unprepared employers are vulnerable and
have little reason to rely on summary judgments in FMLA litigation.
The next step is either trial or settlement. If settlement is selected, a
problem employee is paid and possibly reinstated.6' If a costly jury trial
is the unavoidable solution, the employer's likelihood of winning is
diminished, not by the much noted complexity of the FMLA, but by the
employee-employer relationship.6'
Long before the controversial O.J. Simpson jury decision, the
American jury system had been the subject of serious and cynical
comment. Justice Oliver Wendel Holmes, for example, observed that
juries are not "inspired for the discovery of truth."'62 Mark Twain was
more blunt. Jurors, he said, put a "premium upon ignorance, stupidity
and perjury."63
Even a kinder critic of the jury system would be compelled to
acknowledge that juries are rarely composed of employers; to the
contrary, juries are commonly composed of an employee's peers.' 4 It
is not surprising then that "plaintiffs win 70% of jury trials" and bias in
employment litigation is demonstrable.65 In an American Bar Associa-
tion mock trial concerning an employment issue with evidence heavily
favoring the employer, the employee received a multimillion dollar
damage award.66 A jury room is clearly a tough neighborhood for
employers.67 It is a far better strategy for an employer to either avoid
litigation when practical or to win with summary judgment when
possible.
The complexity of the FMLA, the demanding standards applied to
summary judgment,68 and the fact that summary judgment is rarely
granted in employment litigation69 has led employers to question
60. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22 (pertaining to legal and equitable remedies).
61. See infra text accompanying notes 62-67.
62. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, HOLMES READER,
85, 96-97 (Julius J. Marke, ed., 2d ed. 1964).
63. MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT v. 2 ch. 7 (1872).
64. Jay Finegan, Law and Disorder: (employee lawsuits) Inc., Apr. 1 1994, at 67-68.
65. Id. at 67.
66. Robert J. Aalberts & Lome Seidman, Seeking a 'Safe Harbor'. The Viability of
Summary Judgment in Post-Harris Sexual Harassment Litigation, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 233, 228
(1996).
67. Id. at 228-30 (discussing the defendant's cost of litigating a sexual harassment suit).
68. Hendry, 896 F. Supp. at 822.
69. Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465, 470 (D. Kan. 1996).
("Summary judgments are 'used sparingly in employment discrimination cases.' This is
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whether it is possible to win with summary judgment.
Not only is it possible to win with summary judgment,70 but a
properly advised employer may well avoid the necessity of litigation
altogether. "Properly advised" does not imply that managers must
receive intense training in the construction of obscure terminology. A
properly advised employer must understand two frequently litigated
requirements of the FMLA. First, the employer must understand how
courts construct the phrase "serious health condition."'" Second, the
employer must realize when it has received notice that a serious health
condition is alleged.72
III. SERIOUS HEALTH CONDITION: THE COURTS RESPOND
One of the most controversial phrases in the federal FMLA is
"serious health condition."'73 This is, of course, the condition that
triggers FMLA leave for an employee to care for his or her spouse, son,
daughter, or parent, or to accommodate his or her own illness.74 If
managers are untrained in the application of this phrase and allow a
broad or unreasonable construction, then family and medical leave could
virtually abolish absenteeism as a ground for terminating an unproduc-
tive or even disruptive employee.75 Management has perhaps been
intimidated by a variety of observations from both scholarly commenta-
tors and practicing lawyers.76 Commentators have, for example,
because discrimination claims often turn on the employer's intent ... and courts ordinarily
consider summary judgment inappropriate to settle an issue like intent ....").
70. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,327 (1936) (asserting summary judgment
is not a "disfavored procedural shortcut" but an important procedure "designed 'to secure the
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."') (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1).
71. See infra text accompanying notes 73-125.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 152-225.
73. Daspit, supra note 25, at 1375 ("Review of the comments received by DOL show that
the regulatory definition of 'serious health condition' was one of the most controversial terms
in the Act ... ."). See also 29 CFR § 825.114(a) (1995) (providing an in-depth regulatory
definition of what constitutes a "serious medical condition").
74. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
75. But see Sakellarion v. Judge & Dolph, Ltd., 893 F. Supp. 800 (N.D. 111. 1995) (using
summary judgment to support the termination of an unproductive worker if the proper
procedures are followed). In Sakellarion, the court stated: "Quigley's [employee's supervisor]
affidavit and supporting documentation submitted with the motion for summary judgment
clearly establishes that Sakellarion was not meeting Judge & Dolph's legitimate expectations.
The documents reveal that Sakellarion was prone to excessive absenteeism, with a particular
proclivity for missing Mondays." Id. at 805.
76. For example, a 1992 study by the Rand Corporation indicates that risk-averse
employers perceive employee lawsuits as more threatening than they are in reality, resulting
in employers laying off fewer unproductive workers while also reducing their hiring levels. See
1996]
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described "serious health condition" as "open ended"" and "extremely
broad."78  One practitioner relates that "[v]irtually anything might
qualify"79 as a serious health condition, while another advises employers
to give any employee with a "doctor's note" FMLA leave."
Despite room for broad construction, the emerging law indicates that
it is not impossible for managers to distinguish unjustified leave from
federally mandated FMLA leave. This proposition is supported by
consideration of federal cases that grant or fail to grant summary
judgment when the health condition of an employee or a protected
family member is at issue.
Brannon v. OshKosh B'Gosh, Inc.81 is instructive for several
reasons. First, Brannon established an elaborate absenteeism policy that
allocated points to absent or tardy employees' and provided progres-
sive discipline and ultimate termination based upon points.' Second,
the employee in question, Ms. Brannon, took two leaves which the court
examined in detail. Ms. Brannon's first leave was to treat her own
illness, an upper respiratory infection,84 and the second was to attend
to her three-year-old daughter, who was ill with an infected throat and
an upper respiratory infection.85
The employer elected to implement its stated absenteeism policy and
Ms. Brannon received points for both absences.86 Thus, when she was
absent on yet a third occasion, her point total exceeded the maximum
allowable points and Ms. Brannon was terminated.' However, if the
leave to treat either her illness or her daughter's illness was protected
under the FMLA, then her termination for absenteeism violated the
FMLA. Ms. Brannon, of course, claimed both leaves were the result of
serious health conditions. This was the issue before the court after both
employer and employee moved for summary judgment.88
JAMES N. DERTOUZOS & LYNN A. KAROLY, LABOR-MARKET RESPONSES TO EMPLOYER
LIABILITY 62-63 (1992).
77. Rigler, supra note 25, at 485.
78. Conway, supra note 25, at 518.
79. Bocamazo, supra note 34, at 16 (quoting New York attorney David Block).
80. Id. at 17 (quoting Baltimore attorney Eric Paltell).
81. 897 F. Supp. 1028 (M.D. Tenn. 1995).
82. Id. at 1031.
83. Id. at 1030-31.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1032.
86. Id. at 1032-33.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1028.
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The leave taken by Ms. Brannon for her own illness was not
protected for a reason a trained supervisor should be able to explain:
although Ms. Brannon did have a note from a doctor, it merely indicated
she had made an office visit.8 9 The court ruled that Ms. Brannon could
not show she was unable to work or that her absence was due to her
illness.0
Mrs. Brannon's daughter's illness demonstrates another facet of the
FMLA that managers should be trained to assess. Here the physician's
letter stated "the child should stay in a home environment rather than
day care to facilitate healing and avoid spreading [sic] to other chil-
dren."'" The court noted that the daughter's illness existed for the
required period of more than three consecutive calendar days92 and
concluded she had incurred 'a serious health condition.93 The daughter's
illness thus had caused the absence. According to medical testimony, "if
[the daughter] had a fever, she should have stayed home."'94  Ms.
Brannon's leave to care for her daughter was, therefore, protected
FMLA leave.
In Brannon, the employer failed to obtain summary judgment not
because of "dangerous traps for unwary employer[s]."95 Rather, the
employer simply failed to realize that its rigid absenteeism policy had
become obsolete and that, apart from a maelstrom of technical
regulations, the employee was simply required to relate the cause (the
illness) to the effect (the absence from work).
Unfortunately for employers, cases occur in which a judge avoids the
task of analyzing facts and simply declares the existence of a serious
health condition to be a question of fact for jury resolution.96 Most
decisions, however, benefit employers by carefully analyzing the nature
of the health condition.97 As a result, most employers benefit from a
similar analysis and either avoid litigation altogether or proceed no
89. Id. at 1031.
90. Id. at 1037.
91. Id. at 1033 n.5.
92. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(i) (1995).
93. Brannon, 897 F. Supp. at 1037.
94. Id.
95. Bocamazo, supra note 34, at 16 (quoting Indianapolis attorney David Carr regarding
the FMLA).
96. Wilton Sheppard v. Diversified Foods and Seasonings, No. 95-2235, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2042, at *12 (E.D. La. Feb. 8, 1996) (discussing the judge's reluctance to decide
whether the ongoing treatment of keloids should qualify as a "continuing treatment" under
the language of the FMLA).
97. See infra notes 98-125.
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further than a motion for summary judgment when the health condition
of either the employee or employee's family members is at issue.
Consider the vast majority of FMLA cases directing this conclusion.
In Seidle v. Provident Mutual Life Insurance"8 the plaintiff, Ms.
Seidle, was terminated after a four-day absence in which she attended to
her four-year-old child who was suffering from an ear infection.99 The
plaintiff alleged this was a serious health condition and, therefore, a
justified penalty-free FMLA leave."
The child had been treated by a physician, but Ms. Seidle also relied
heavily on the affidavits of two additional physicians to argue that the
child's ear infection was a serious health condition. The first physician
was an otolaryngologist specializing in diseases of the ear and the other
physician was a staff physician in a department of emergency medi-
cine. 1' Both physicians referred to the child's illness as "serious."102
Perhaps acknowledging the observations of commentators and
practitioners noted above, the court observed that the definition of
"serious health condition" is "somewhat ambiguous."1 3 Noting that
the opinions expressed in the affidavits were based on "the potential
dangers" of the otitis media suffered by the child, the court concluded
that this child on this occasion did not suffer from a serious health
condition.""° The employer's motion for summary judgment was
granted.0 5
In January of 1996, a United States District Judge in Bauer v.
Dayton-Walter"'6 finally referred to "serious health condition" as a
term of art.0 7 In Bauer, the plaintiff missed several days of work for
reasons related to rectal bleeding and was terminated pursuant to yet
another point system activated by absenteeism. 8 The plaintiff claimed
his leave was protected by the FMLA because it was the result of a
serious health condition." After citing the FMLA and the regulations
that struggle to interpret it, the court reached the conclusion that:
98. 871 F. Supp. 238 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
99. Id. at 240.
100. Id. at 239.
101. Id. at 244-45.
102. Id. at 245.
103. Id. at 242.
104. Id. at 246.
105. Id.
106. 910 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. Ky. 1996).
107. Id. at 309
108. Id. at 308.
109. Id. at 307.
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"[R]ectal bleeding is not a player among the 'serious health conditions'
cast by Congress."'" 0 Citing Seidle, the court stated the FMLA was
intended for "much more serious illnesses""' and affirmed that the
"condition must be taken for what it was during the relevant time period,
and not for what it could have conceivably become.""'
In a 1996 case, Gudenkauf v. Stauffer,"' a similar line of reasoning
prevailed. Citing Sakellarion v. Judge & Dolph, Ltd.,"4 Brannon,"5
and Seidle,"6 the court found that "[t]he plaintiff's deposition testimony
and affidavit are insufficient evidence to base a finding that the plaintiff's
pregnancy and related conditions kept her from performing the functions
of her job for more than one-half day.""' 7 Another 1996 case, Hott v.
VDO Yazaki Corp.,"' cited the child's ear infection noted in Seidle,
and declared that sinobronchitis did not constitute a serious health condi-
tion. 9
The apparent concern that employers cannot cope with the task of
distinguishing a serious health condition from a mundane ailment is
being relieved by federal court decisions. The conclusion that "[v]irtually
anything might qualify" is a generally unjustified reaction.' 2  In
applying this phrase, federal courts have generally shown their willing-
ness to carefully examine the debilitating impact of health conditions on
employees or members of their families. Moreover, the majority of
illnesses claimed are not exotic; a child's ear infection,12' rectal bleed-
ing, 122 an asthma attack," and chicken pox'24 are representative.
110. Id. at 311.
111. Id. at 310.
112. Id. at 311.
113. Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465 (D. Kan. 1996).
114. Id. at 476. "[P]laintiff's assertion that her adult daughter needed to stay in bed,
without more, is not sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer that the daughter was
incapable of self-care." Id. (quoting Sakellarion, 893 F. Supp. at 800, 808 (N.D. Ill. 1995)).
115. Id. "[P]laintiff's own testimony that she was 'too sick to work' is also insufficient
to prove that her absence was necessary." Id. (quoting Brannon, 897 F. Supp. at 1037).
116. Id. at 475.
117. Id at 475-76.
118. Hott v. VDO Yazaki Corp., 922 F. Supp. 1114, 1128 (W.D. Va. 1996) ("[Seidle's
child's ear infection did not constitute a 'serious health condition' where the treatment
consisted of one twenty-minute doctor's examination and a ten-day regimen of antibiotics and
where the child was not absent from daycare for more than three days.").
119. Id. ("The parties present no evidence on this issue. The plaintiff argues merely that
she had suffered from sinusitis bronchitis for a considerable period of time and had undergone
continuing treatment for this condition.").
120. Bocamazo, supra note 34, at 16.
121. Seidle, 871 F. Supp. at 240.
122. Bauer, 910 F. Supp. at 308.
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Contrary to the concerns of commentators, federal courts are
developing a rational body of law interpreting the ambiguous phrase
"serious health condition." A reasonably well-trained person can apply
this body of law to a known cluster of facts and is not expected to
develop a prognosis when confronted with a symptom of what may or
may not become serious.
The emerging body of federal case law interpreting the FMLA
construes "serious health condition" as a presently existing condition that
in fact debilitates an employee and necessitates an employee's ab-
sence.125 Managers can be trained to cope with this concept. Employ-
ees do not commonly assert incomprehensible ailments or legalistic
definitions of commonplace terms. The devil is not in the details of the
FMLA or its regulations-though these are unquestionably complex.
The central postulate is that a debilitating health condition must be the
demonstrated cause of an employee's absence. And, as the following
cases indicate, federal courts have shown no indication that the FMLA
will be construed to shelter incompetency. Rather, even in the presence
of serious health conditions that could result in FMLA mandated leave,
an employee may be fired for reasons unrelated to the illness.
A. Granting Leave for a Serious Medical Condition: Does It Preclude
the Subsequent Termination of Unproductive Workers?
McCown v. UOP26 provides an illustrative example of an unpro-
ductive worker unable to shield herself by using the FMLA. In
McCown, the plaintiff's twelve-year-old daughter had been molested by
a teen-age boy.127 The daughter's pediatrician recommended that Ms.
McCown be at home when the girl returned from school and called her
attention to the FMLA.'" Subsequently, Ms. McCown was granted
FMLA leave in the form of reduced work hours several days a week."2 9
Four months later, however, she was terminated for poor perfor-
mance. 3 Ms. McCown alleged the termination was actually "retalia-
123. Sakellarion, 893 F. Supp. at 803.
124. Reich v. Midwest Plastic Eng'g, Inc., No. 1:94-CV-525,1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12130
(W.D. Mich. July 22, 1995).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 73-125.
126. No. 94-C-2179, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12655, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 1995).
127. Id. at *5.
128. Id. at *6.
129. Id. at *6-7.
130. Id. at *9.
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tion for exercising her rights under the FMLA."''
The employer, however, assembled records and witnesses proving
that the plaintiff had established herself as uncooperative and rude."2
Ms. McCown often arrived for work late and left early,' made
excessive personal phone calls" 4 and failed to perform duties she was
assigned. 5  The employer had thus articulated legitimate, non-
discriminatory grounds for Ms. McCown's termination. Her termination
was not related to a serious health condition and the court would not
construe the FMLA to protect an inefficient employee.3 6
Similarly, in Niemiec v. H & K Inc.,37 Ms. Niemiec was terminated
from her clerical position at H & K Machine."3 The company claimed
the termination was for justifiable cause. Ms. Niemiec alleged the
termination resulted because she was pregnant and took a leave of
absence to give birth to a disabled child.139 After noting that the
plaintiff had "a difficult time keeping up with" her work and processed
"information inaccurately,""'' the court concluded that the alleged
"suspicious timing" of Ms. Niemiec's termination did not satisfy her
burden of proof and granted the employer summary judgment.'4a
"[T]he FMLA is not a strict liability statute," the court explained. 42
In Niemiec, the employer demonstrated that its Vice President for
Operations began building a case to establish the employee's poor
performance before the FMLA leave and provided the plaintiff with
warning to this effect. 43 Although the court noted that the timing of
discharge required that it be "particularly watchful for evidence of
pretext," it will not compel employers to retain inefficient employees
even in the face of a serious health condition.'4
Sakellarion v. Judge & Dolph, Ltd., a third case in which the
employee was legally terminated for cause, confirms that courts look for
131. Id. at *10.
132. Id. at *3.
133. Id. at *7.
134. Id. at *8.
135. Id. at *9.
136. L
137. Id. No. 94-C-553, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20772 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 26, 1995).
138. Id. at *3.
139. Id. at *4-5.
140. Id. at *2.
141. Id. at *5.
142. Id. at *7.
143. Id. at *2.
144. Id. at "5.
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some real element of medical urgency to invoke FMLA protections.45
Ms. Sakellarion, a sixty-two-year-old employee of a beverage distributor,
was terminated for repeated absences, poor job performance, and
disruptive insubordinate conduct." Ms. Sakellarion alleged her
dismissal was the result of her taking protected FMLA leave to care for
her thirty-six-year-old daughter who had been hospitalized as the result
of an asthma attack. 47 The plaintiff, however, failed to present any
evidence indicating that her daughter required continued care and, thus,
suffered a serious health condition. 48 Again, the employer's motion
for summary judgment was granted. 49
In Sakallerion, as in Niemiec, despite warning from the employer, the
plaintiff's performance did not improve and, in fact, became "increasing-
ly careless."' 5° As in Niemiec, claims of a serious health condition were
insufficient to secure employment for an inefficient employee.'
IV. THE EMPLOYEE'S NOTICE REQUIREMENT
The requirement that a covered employer grant an eligible employee
FMLA leave is the conclusion of a two-step analysis. As noted above,
the employee or a protected family member must suffer from a serious
health condition-a requirement that has received scrutiny by federal
courts. 52 A second directly related, but very different problem has
evolved from the requirement that the affected employee provide an
employer with adequate notice that FMLA leave is required.53
Without sufficient notice, the employer cannot determine if the
requested leave is protected by the FMLA and if denying leave would
violate the law.
145. Sakallerion v. Judge & Dolph, Ltd., 893 F. Supp. 800 (N.D. 11. 1995).
146. Id. at 802.
147. Id. at 807.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 802.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 137-144.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 73-125.
153. See, e.g., Reich v. Midwest Plastic Eng'g, Inc., No. 1:94-CV-525, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 121304 at *10 (W.D. Mich. July 22, 1995). In Reich, the court stated:
But the question before the Court at this time is very different. Rather
than determining whether her condition was in fact a "serious health
condition" under the Act and regulations, the Court must now determine
whether Ms. Van Dosen informed Midwest of her condition with sufficient
detail to make it evident that the requested leave was protected as FMLA-
qualifying leave.
Id. (emphasis added).
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The Department of Labor's current regulations construing the FMLA
(effective April 6, 1995) recognize the employer's need for notice."
An employee with a foreseeable need for FMLA leave may be required
to provide at least thirty days advance notice if possible. 5 If the need
is not foreseeable, then an employer must be informed "as soon as
practicable,"'56 but the guideline is "two working days from learning of
the need."' 7  The notice requirement thus presents two issues that
have required the consideration of federal courts: whether an expression
constitutes adequate notice to the employer and whether the employer
received notice within the allowable time.
Under interim regulations interpreting the FMLA, the Secretary of
Labor had specified that, to take foreseeable FMLA leave, an employee
"need not express certain rights under the FMLA or even mention the
FMLA."'5 8 The "discussion of unforeseen leave, however, did not
mention this disclaimer. 5 9 An appellate court construed this as an
inadvertent omission of the regulators"s° and the current regulations
confirm that decision.16' Thus, under the interim and the current
regulations, employees need not specifically assert their rights under the
FMLA. Both case law preceding the current regulations, and now the
regulations themselves, acknowledge that employees are "ill-equipped to
identify the statutory source of their right."' 62 Therefore, early cases
154. 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(a) (1995). The regulations were originally to go into effect
February 6, 1995, but were postponed by the Department of Labor until April 6, 1995, due
to public response. See United States Department of Labor, News Release, USDL 95-118
(Apr. 6, 1995).
155. 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(a).
156. Id. § 825.302(b) ("'[A]s soon as practicable' means as soon as both possible and
practical, taking into account all of the facts and circumstances of the individual case.").
157. Id. § 825.305(a). The section reads in pertinent part:
[W]hen the approximate timing of the leave is not foreseeable, an employee
should give notice to the employer of the need for FMLA leave as soon as
practicable under the facts and circumstances of the particular case. It is
expected that an employee will give notice to the employer within no more
than one or two working days of learning of the need for leave, except in
extraordinary circumstances where such notice is not feasible.
Id.
158. Manuel v. Westlake Polymers Corp., 66 F.3d 758, 761 (5th Cir. 1995).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 763 ("[R]equiring employees unable to foresee their need for leave to
expressly invoke the FMLA's protection would significantly burden the employees.
Employees often cannot foresee their need for medical or family leave.").
161. 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(b) ("The employee need not expressly assert rights under the
FMLA or even mention the FMLA, but may only state that leave is needed.").
162. Manuel, 66 F.3d at 763.
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on the notice requirement are instructive.
The FMLA imposes a notice requirement on "workers not law-
yers"163 who are not expected to "become conversant with the legal
intricacies of the Act."1" Therefore, employers must develop an
understanding of circumstances that constitute notice. This is crucial
because once notice is received, the Act directs that the "employer will
be expected to obtain any additional required information through
informal means" and permits the employer to require "certification
issued by the health care provider of the employee."'" Commentators
have declared this an onerous burden on employers."6 However, the
cases on point, which are discussed below, indicate that employers fail to
meet this requirement because they have not been trained to respond.
In Brannon v. OshKosh B'Gosh, Inc.,167 the court granted FMLA
leave based on the employee's need to attend to her ill daughter."s
Ms. Brannon had sent a note from a physician to her supervisor stating,
"[p]lease excuse off work [sic] till 1-12-94." '169 She had called the
employer the. following day to give notice of her absence and had
specifically told her supervisor that her daughter "was too sick for her to
come to work."'70 In response, "no one at OshKosh inquired about
the diagnosis ... the doctor visit or about any medications or treat-
ment." ' The employee, however, did state the reason she was absent
and did so "as soon as practicable."172 OshKosh made no inquiries, but
simply assessed points for the absence and ultimately violated the
FMLA.173  Without reference to the FMLA, Ms. Brannon made an
obvious reference to a serious health condition as the reason for her
absence, but management had not been trained to understand it.
Similarly, Ms. Hendry, in Hendry v. GTE North, Inc.,74 stated she
"was not told about the FMLA."'75 Like Ms. Brannon, Ms. Hendry
163. Id.
164. Id. at 764.
165. 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(b).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
167. 897 F. Supp. 1028 (M.D. Tenn. 1995).
168. Id at 1032.
169. Id. at 1033.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1038 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(a) (1995)).
173. Id. at 1033.
174. 896 F. Supp. 816 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
175. Id at 821.
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was terminated pursuant to her employer's absence-control policy. 176
As calculated by her employer, she had exceeded available policy leave
days, "reportedly for a migraine headache."'" Noting that an employ-
ee need only provide verbal notice that she "needs FMLA-qualifying
leave," the court concluded Ms. Hendry complied with the require-
ments.'78 The employer had the obligation to inquire further after this
verbal notice, yet there was no indication the employer made any effort
to assess Ms. Hendry's allegedly serious health condition.'79
McGinnis v. Wonder Chemical Co ° confirms the fact that the
employee's notice requirement does not demand an elaborate description
of an alleged health condition. Mr. McGinnis was a maintenance
supervisor who repeatedly told his supervisor of his increasingly severe
back pain and eventually took leave.' The employer claimed the
absence could not be considered FMLA leave because Mr. McGinnis
"failed to provide sufficient notice."'' Again, a federal court notes
that verbal notice is adequate"s' and an employee "need not assert
rights under the FMLA."' 4 The employee need only state a qualifying
reason, and this had been accomplished."
The foregoing demonstrates that when presented with claims of a
health condition, managers must be trained to understand the conse-
quences of the explanations they receive. Claims for FMLA leave may
not, and probably will not, be neatly labeled as such. Nor is it likely
they will be fully articulated by employees who have received legal
training or advice. Still, once notice is received for foreseeable or
unforeseeable leave, the employer is obligated to inquire further and
obtain any additional information before denying FMLA benefits."6
Employers need not overreact to this obligation. Just as every health
condition is not a serious health condition, every suggestion of a serious
health condition is not notice even under the generous provisions of the
FMLA.
Title I of the FMLA allows the Secretary of Labor to sue for
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 828.
179. Id. at 827.
180. No. 95-4384, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18909, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 1995).
181. Id. at *2.
182. Id. at *11.
183. Id. at *12.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c) (1995).
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damages on behalf of employees.3'7 In that capacity, Robert Reich
initiated an action against Midwest Plastic.'88 The main issue con-
cerned the adequacy of the notice a seriously ill employee provided to
her employer.189 Although the ultimate decision resulted from a bench
trial, motions for summary judgment had narrowed the issue. The court
established that the employee, Ms. Van Dosen, did incur a serious health
condition (chicken pox), that notice requirements specified in the
employee's handbook were irrelevant,"9 and that the "sole [issue] for
trial [was] whether Ms. Van Dosen adequately provided notice" to her
employer. 191
Before resolving this issue, the court stated the applicable law as
follows: "When the need for leave ... is not foreseeable, an employee
should give notice to the employer of the need for FMLA leave as soon
as practicable under the facts and circumstances of the particular
case."'" The court also noted that "except in extraordinary circum-
stances" this notice must be provided within one or two working days of
learning of the need for leave.193 At a minimum this notice must
inform the employer of the employee's "condition with sufficient detail
to make it evident that the requested leave is protected as FMLA-
qualifying leave."194
Significantly, the court placed great emphasis on this point and
proceeded to illustrate it with a hypothetical example. In the court's
example, two employees were involved in separate car accidents. One
was hospitalized as a result of injuries, while the other, though uninjured,
used the next work day to go fishing.' 9 Each employee called their
employer the day after their accident to report that "he had been
involved in a car accident.', 196  The hospitalized employee clearly
suffered a serious health condition, the other clearly did not. Neither
employee, however, "provided the employer with adequate notice of his
187. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(b) (providing for the enforcement of the FMLA and the recovery
of damages).
188. Reich v. Midwest Plastic Eng'g, Inc., No. 1:94-CV-525, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12130,
at *1 (W.D. Mich. July 22, 1995).
189. Id. at *7.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at *8.
193. Id.
194. Id. at *9.
195. Id. at *10-11.
196. Id. at *11 (emphasis added).
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need for FMLA-leave."' The hospitalized employee, the court
instructed, "should have stated that he had been hospitalized as the
result of the accident.'
198
Thrning to the facts of the case before it, the court noted that Ms.
Van Dosen had communicated directly or indirectly on "only three
occasions," but had not provided "sufficient detail" to indicate a serious
health condition.99 Ms. Van Dosen's first contact was a telephone
message to her employer stating that she had been to an emergency
room, that she believed she had contracted chicken pox, and that she
would see her doctor that day.2' The second contact occurred the
following day when Ms. Van Dosen called again and informed a shift
foreman that she did, in fact, have chicken pox."' The third contact
with the employer was made indirectly three days later by Mr. Mit-
schelen, a friend of Ms. Van Dosen.' Mr. Mitschelen testified he told
the employer that the plaintiff had been hospitalized as a result of
chicken pox.' The employer denied that this information was
provided. Without explanation, the court found the employer's version
"more credible."'
Assessing these facts in the shadow of its hypothetical, the court
concluded that Ms. Van Dosen failed to provide her employer with
notice of her serious health condition. She had failed to communicate
sufficient information with sufficient detail to indicate that she required
FMLA protected leave.2 5
Next, having decided the case, the judge gratuitously noted that even
if Ms. Van Dosen had communicated her condition in sufficient detail,
she had not done so as soon as practicable.2 6 Ms. Von Dosen was
able to go to the bank the same afternoon Mr. Mitschelen contacted her
employer, yet by that time she had still not provided her employer with
adequate notice of her illness, which she was apparently "practicably"
able to do.' Finally, the court concluded that even if Ms. Van Dosen
had established a serious health condition, she failed to update her
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at *12.
200. Id. at *3.
201. Id.
202. Id. at *3-4.
203. Id. at *4.
204. Id.
205. Id. at *2.
206. Id. at *13.
207. Id.
1996]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
employer of her status and her intent to return to work as the employer
lawfully required. °' This alone gave Midwest grounds to terminate
her.
In January of 1996, Johnson v. Primerica,0 9 a second significant
federal case concerning the employee's notice requirement, was decided.
Like the Reich case,21° the court in a bench trial found that the employ-
ee, Mr. Johnson, had failed to provide his employer with FMLA-required
notice. n Thus, after exceeding his allowable personal leave, Mr.
Johnson was properly terminated. In Johnson, the court provided an
encouraging indication to employers that they need not accommodate
"oblique references" to illness made by an erratic employee.
The events leading to Mr. Johnson's termination began when he
failed to report for work several days in succession and "failed to call the
office to give any reason for his absence." '214 Upon his return, Mr.
Johnson explained to his supervisor that he was "handling personal
matters" and indicated a need for additional leave to "help his family
start up a family business.'p21 As directed, Mr. Johnson subsequently
submitted this request in written form indicating the leave was necessary
"to [attend to] a matter.., of significant financial importance to [his]
immediate and extended family. 21 6 His request was denied. Thereaf-
ter, Mr. Johnson missed additional work and again failed to call the
office. He was then terminated.217
Mr. Johnson argued that he was unjustly terminated and that his
leave had been protected by the FMLA because he was needed at home
to care for his ill child.218 He alleged that FMLA leave should have
been granted "despite the poorly drafted memorandum" '219 because his
supervisors were aware that his three-year-old son suffered from "an
208. Id. at *13-14. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(b) (1995) ("The employee or spokesperson
will be expected to provide more information when it can readily be accomplished as a
practical matter, taking into consideration the exigencies of the situation."). See also
§ 825.309(a) ("An employer may require an employee on FMLA leave to report periodically
on the employee's status and intent to return to work.").
209. No. 94-C-4869, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 869 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1996).
210. Reich, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12130, at *13.
211. Johnson, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 869 at *2.
212. Id. at *6.
213. Id. at *16.
214. Id. at *3.
215. Id. at *34.
216. Id. at *4.
217. Id. at *6.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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acute condition of asthma."'  Mr. Johnson testified that "[when] he
requested leave 'he intimated' to [his employer] that his son was ill."221
Although noting that an employee need not refer to the FMLA in
requesting FMLA leave, the court ruled in favor of the employer, ruling
on the proposition that the employee must "provide sufficient informa-
tion to put the employer on notice that the leave is qualified."2 2 An
employer, the court stated, is not required to be clairvoyant.' z
Based on the facts in Johnson, the decision seems obvious. Still,
employers ought to exercise caution. Mr. Johnson held a bachelors
degree in business administration and was a "group leader" for the
employer's inventory control system, supervising four employees. 4 In
addition, he had previously made his supervisors aware of his son's
illness. He could not, the court observed, "shield himself behind
inexperience or naivete."'
These facts are indeed relevant. The court appears to have
acknowledged that some employees, unlike Mr. Johnson, are incapable
of clearly articulating explanations and are "disinclined to reveal
personal matters." 6  Employers, it seems, must be aware of the
sophistication of their employees when assessing the content of notice.
Employees in a different setting, perhaps coping with an embarrassing
health condition, may be held to a lower standard of specificity than Mr.
Johnson. To date, case law does not indicate that the adequacy of
FMLA notice should be judged on a sliding scale, but dicta in Johnson
has the potential to become significant.
V. CONCLUSION
The FMLA unquestionably imposes burdens on covered employers.
They may, for example, be compelled to reconstruct current absence-
control policies that ignore the consequences of a serious health
condition. 7 Similarly, they may be compelled to maintain more detailed
attendance records. More certainly, employers are required to properly
220. Id. at *12-13.
221. Id. at *16.
222. Id. at *19.
223. Id. at *16.
224. Id. at *2-3.
225. Id. at *19-20.
226. Id. at *20.
227. See, e.g., Brannon v. OshKosk B'Gosh, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 1028 (M.D. Tenn. 1995).
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notify employees of rights and obligations arising from the FMLA22
and assess the necessity of FMLA leave when it is requested.229 In
addition to the known burdens, other provisions in this relatively new
legislation await judicial construction, leading practitioners and managers
to wonder if anyone can get them right. 3°
However, two provisions in the FMLA, the serious health condition
provision231 and the proper notice provision,232 will be central to
every request for protected leave. Contrary to some perceptions, the
judicial construction of these requirements has not been "employer-
hostile" and managers can be trained to accurately comply with the
FMLA.23
3
To conclude from existing case law that the socioeconomic status of
federal judges, unlike that of juries, would cause empathy with managers
attempting to remove troublesome employees from the workplace when
ruling on motions for summary judgment, is perhaps speculative. 2'
However, it is not speculative to conclude that federal judges have, in
the absence of a jury, constructed these central requirements of the
FMLA in a manner that employers can apply.
According to Bauer v. Dayton-Walter235 and Seidle v. Provident
Mutual Life Insurance, 6 a serious health condition is a debilitating
condition that is the direct cause of an employee's absence. Standing
alone, neither an illness that may become serious, nor symptoms of an
illness that may be serious, constitute a serious health condition.
Additionally, as Seidle,237 Brannon v. OshKosh B'Gosh, Inc. 238 and
228. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 825.300 (discussing posting obligations). See also id. § 825.301
(discussing written policies, handbooks and other written guidance).
229. See, e.g., id. § 825.303(c) (discussing employer's duty to give notice of employee's
needs for FMLA-qualifying leave and timing and duration of the leave).
230. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
231. See supra text and accompanying notes 73-125.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 152-226.
233. Thom Weidlich, Leave Law Still Draws Ire Despite Employer Wins, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
9, 1995, at B1.
234. See Robert J. Aalberts & Kenneth C. Fonte, Is Section 2C of the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct Justified? An Empirical Study of the Impropriety of Judges Belonging to
Exclusive Clubs, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 597, 608-611 (1995) (discussing the applicability of
in-group, out-group analysis which classifies judges as in-group members, while others,
particularly women and minorities, are considered out-group members).
235. 910 F. Supp. 306,309-10 (E.D. Ky. 1996); see supra text accompanying notes 106-112
(discussing Bauer).
236. 897 F. Supp. 238,241-45 (E.D. Pa. 1994); see supra text accompanying notes 98-105
(discussing Seidle).
237. Id.
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McCown v. UOP"9 demonstrate, federal courts are not bedazzled by
doctor's notes. The existence of a health condition is not necessarily
serious and the assertion of a health condition will not derail disciplinary
action for reasons an employer has documented, as indicated by both
Niemiec v. H&K Inc.2' and Sakellarion v. Judge & Dolph, Ltd.24
Federal courts seem to clearly insist that, regardless of the nature of
the health condition, an employer must receive sufficient notice when
protected FMLA leave is requested.242 Once notified, employers are
not simply saddled with the responsibility to confirm the necessity of the
leave, they are given the authority to investigate and obtain appropriate
certification.243
While case law2 4 and FMLA regulations245 clearly indicate that
employees need not cite the FMLA in their request, Brannon,246
Johnson v. Primeria,247 McGinnis v. Wonder Chemical Co.,2¢I and
most certainly Reich v. Midwest Plastics249 indicate that the employer
must receive sufficient information to reach an informed decision. While
a sliding scale of specificity keyed to an employee's level of sophistica-
238. 897 F. Supp. 1028 (M.D. Tenn.1995); see supra text accompanying notes 81-95
(discussing Brannon).
239. No. 94-C-2179, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12655, at *1 (N.D. I11. Aug. 29, 1995); see
supra text accompanying notes 126-136 (discussing McCown).
240. No. 94-C-553, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20772 at *1 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 26, 1995); see
supra text accompanying notes 137-144 (discussing Niemiec).
241. 893 F. Supp. 800 (N.D. Ill. 1995); see supra text accompanying notes 145-151
(discussing Sakellarion).
242. See, e.g., Johnson, No. 94-C-4869, 1996 U.S. Dist., LEXIS, 869 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
29, 1996); see supra text accompanying notes 209-226 (discussing Johnson).
243. 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c). The section reads in relevant part:
The employer should inquire further of the employee if it is necessary to have more
information about whether FMLA leave is being sought by the employee, and obtain
the necessary details of the leave to be taken. In the case of medical conditions, the
employer may find it necessary to inquire further to determine if the leave is because
of a serious health condition and may request medical certification to support the
need for such leave.
Id.
244. See, e.g., Manuel v. Westlake Polymers Corp., 66 F.3d at 758 (5th Cir. 1995). See
also supra text and accompanying notes 158-164 (discussing Manuel).
245. 29 C.F.R. § 825.303 ("The employee need not expressly assert rights under the
FMLA or even mention the FMLA, but may only state that leave is needed.").
246. 897 F. Supp. at 1028; see supra text accompanying notes 81-95 (discussing Brannon).
247. No. 94-C-4869, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 869 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1996); see supra text
accompanying notes 209-226 (discussing Johnson).
248. No. 95-4384, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18909 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 1995); see supra text
accompanying notes 180-185 (discussing McGinnis).
249. No. 1:94-CV-525,1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12130 (S.D. Mich. July 22, 1995); see supra
text accompanying notes 188-208 (discussing Reich).
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tion may be suggested in Johnson, 0 at this point, courts have not
demonstrated a tolerance for vague references to serious health
conditions.
A review of federal cases considering serious health conditions and
the adequacy of notice to an employer seems to connect the dots. Such
a review diagrams a judicial construction of the FMLA supporting two
basic conclusions. First, federal courts are reasonable in assessing the
severity of health conditions. Second, employers must be provided with
sufficient information to exercise their rights and meet their responsibili-
ties. These basic provisions of the FMLA do not defy comprehension;
employers and employees should be advised accordingly.
250. 94-C-4869, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 869; see supra text accompanying notes 209-226
(discussing Johnson).
[Vol. 80:135
